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The paper illustrates and describes the structure of a new quantitative model of risk analysis for road tunnels 
named TRAM (Tunnel Risk Analysis Model). The result of the model, in accordance with the European 
Directive and the Italian Legislative Decree, returns the F-N curves of societal risk, in other words functions 
that relate the frequency of occurrence of an accidental scenario (F) with the expected consequences in terms 
of potential victims (N).  
Starting from two types of initial events, a fire and a Dangerous Goods (DG) release, a total of 18 accidental 
scenarios was defined. The frequencies of occurrence of each accidental scenario is obtained using the Event 
Tree Analysis (ETA) technique. For each scenario, the number of fatalities, expressed in terms of deaths, is 
obtained by simulating the formation dynamics of the queue of vehicles, using a model able to calculate the 
queue length, depending on traffic, the vehicle type, as well as the closure time of the tunnel. Then, a 
distribution model of the potentially exposed users has been defined and coupled with an egress model. The 
users’ tenability is estimated on the basis of the egress model and the evolution of each accidental scenario, 
which is evaluated using a zone model. The proposed model can simulate each of the 18 accidental scenarios 
in several different positions along the tunnel, considering the impact that different tunnel infrastructure 
measures, equipment and management procedures can have on the users egress and on the propagation of 
the effects of the accidental scenarios. The model is able to consider the interdependence between these 
measures and their reliability in terms of their availability in an emergency situation. Finally, to validate the 
model, comparisons are made with the QRAM software developed by PIARC for some representative case 
studies. Through this model, it is possible to perform the risk analysis of a tunnel in an actual configuration and 
compare the expected value of damage with the corresponding one of the tunnel in a virtual configuration, as 
prescribed by the Italian decree compliant with the European Directive 2004/54/EC. 
1. Introduction 
Some severe tunnel fires in Europe, such as those of the Mont Blanc, Gotthard and Tauern tunnels, have 
clearly displayed the dramatic urgency of adapting the road and rail tunnels to higher safety standards (Tavelli 
et al., 2013). Fires in tunnels are a threat not just for the safety of users but also for rescue teams (Borghetti et 
al., 2017). These issues push public authorities and tunnel designers to take increasing account of risks 
connected with fires. For a given accidental scenario, the set of consequences and their magnitude depend in 
turn on the instruments and mitigation actions started at the tunnel design and management levels, and 
involve the following factors: human behaviour, structural solutions, technological systems, management and 
control procedures. 
The process of evacuation from a tunnel in emergency conditions is a complex phenomenon that involves 
different factors, tied to both physical characteristics such as the tunnel geometry or the distance between the 
emergency exits, and human behaviour. The evacuation time is mainly influenced by the users’ speed during 
evacuation and by their pre-movement time which is the time required for occupants to identify the fire and 
respond to it (Lovreglio et al., 2015, 2016). Finally, the user safety is influenced by the effects of the accidental 
event, such as the propagation of toxic gases and reduced visibility, as the user movement speed can reduce 
dramatically in cases of reduced visibility and in the presence of harmful gas (Fridolf et al., 2013). In addition, 
the presence of systems such as emergency ventilation can have a positive effect on movement speed, 
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slowing the development of smoke in the tunnel. Additionally, safety measures such as firefighters or 
firefighting systems, or devices capable of closing the tunnel and reducing the number of exposed users 
(including panels, signs and loudspeakers able to inform and direct the users towards safety areas) are of 
significant importance. A comprehensive risk analysis model has to include the potential effect of all these 
measures (both technical and operational) and their interdependence. In this way it is possible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of each measure. The analysis can support the decision of the tunnel managers by identifying 
the optimal strategies and investments for maximizing tunnel safety.  
2. Model Structure 
TRAM is a comprehensive quantitative risk analysis model for road tunnels considering plant, infrastructure 
and management measures prescribed by EU Directive 2004/54/EC on minimum safety requirements for 
tunnels in the Trans-European Road Network. The risk assessment is done through the evaluation of F-N 
curves (Frequencies of accidental scenarios - Number of fatalities) and the comparison with the ALARP (As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable) criterion of acceptability. 
The frequencies of the different accidental scenarios are obtained through an event tree analysis, starting with 
the frequency of the initial accidental events. The number of fatalities, expressed in terms of deaths, is 
obtained by simulating the formation dynamics of the queue of vehicles, using a model able to calculate the 
queue length, depending on traffic, the vehicle type, as well as the closure time of the tunnel. Then, a 
distribution model of the potentially exposed users has been defined and finally an egress model, to compare 
the evacuation time of users with their maximum residence time in the tunnel. The model is able to consider 
the reliability of the safety measures of the tunnel in terms of their availability in an emergency situation. In 
addition, it is assessed the interdependence between the various measures in order to represent their 
contribution in the users evacuation process. Figure 1 shows the logical structure of the TRAM model.  
 
 
Figure 1: Logical outline of the implemented Tunnel Risk Analysis Model (TRAM) 
2.1 Event tree analysis and frequencies of occurrence of accidental scenarios 
The model takes into consideration two initial events, a fire and a DG spill, characterised by an initial 
occurrence frequency, Ffire and Frel. These events are typical, and representative of the tunnel system 
intended as a confined environment. Table 1 shows the estimated Heat Release Rate (HRR) associated with 
the difference categories of vehicles and DG release events. The reported values represent the maximum fire 
intensity that can be reached for each fire scenario. Using the event tree, the model is currently able to 
analyze 14 accidental scenarios, 5 of which are associated with fire and 9 with DG release. Additional fire 
HRRs (4 MW, 25 MW, 80 MW and 100 MW) are considered in the case of mitigation measures such as the 
automatic fire extinguishing system or suppression system that can reduce the fire intensity. In this case the 
total number is 18. In fact, the model assumes that the presence of the mitigation systems is able to reduce 
the HRR of the smaller fires of ~50 %. Therefore, the 15 MW scenario is included in the 8 MW one. 
As an example, Figure 2 illustrates an event tree that gives the different scenarios ?? with associated 
frequency ??, starting from the intial frequency of the fire event Ffire. 
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Table 1: Accidental scenarios: HHR associated with the initial fires and final scenarios related to a DG release 
Initial event N. accidental scenario Accidental scenario SCs Description 
Fire 
1 F1 Fire LV1, Q= 8 MW Light vehicle - LV1 
2 F2 Fire LV2, Q= 15 MW Light vehicle – LV2 
3 F3 Fire HV1, Q= 50 MW Heavy vehicle - HV1 
4 F4 Fire HV2, Q= 100 MW Heavy vehicle – HV2 
5 F5 Fire DGV, Q= 150 MW Dangerous Good Vehicle 
DG release 
6 R1 Pool-fire (relevant spill)  
7 R2 Pool-fire (small spill)  
8 R3 Jet-fire/BLEVE (liq+vap)  
9 R4 Toxic dispersion (gas, relevant)  
10 R5 Toxic dispersion (vapors, relevant)  
11 R6 Jet-fire (gas)  
12 R7 Jet-fire (gas/vapors)  
13 R8 VCE/Flash-fire (gas)  
14 R9 VCE/Pool-/Flash-fire (liq+vap)  
The following additional accidental scenarios and HRR are considered only in case of presence of automatic fire 
extinguishing systems or suppression systems. The scenario corresponding to the 15 MW LV2 is included in the 8 MW. 
 15 F6 Fire LV1, Q= 4 MW Light vehicle - LV1 
 16 F7 Fire HV1, Q= 25 MW Heavy vehicle - HV1 
 17 F8 Fire HV2, Q= 80 MW Heavy vehicle – HV2 
 18 F9 Fire DG, Q= 120 MW Dangerous Good Vehicle 
 
The calculation model predicts that the s-th scenario can occur at different points in the tunnel: in this manner, 
it is hypothesised that the source of the initial event can be located in a generic position as a percentage of the 
total length of the tunnel Ltot. A minimum of 6 positions is considered, as indicated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of an event tree related to the initial fire event 
 
 
Figure 3: Examples of positions at which the accidental scenario can occur (tunnel with unidirectional traffic) 
813
2.2 Tunnel infrastructure measures, equipment and management procedures 
The model considers the total number of tunnel infrastructure measures, equipment and management 
procedures that can be present in a specific tunnel under investigation. Each measure influences a specific 
model parameter. For example, the presence of a mechanical ventilation system and emergency lighting 
influence the user egress speed. The measures can also influence the frequencies of occurrence Fs of the 
accidental scenarios in the event tree. Further examples of measures considered in the model are the 
presence of flammable liquid drainage, water supply system, specialised rescue team, control centre, event 
automatic identification cameras, traffic lights at the tunnel entrance, GSM coverage, emergency stations, 
evacuation lighting, etc. 
2.3 Queue formation model 
Using this sub-model, it is possible to simulate the formation of queues of vehicles in the tunnel by evaluating 
the position of the vehicles and their stopping times. The model gives the length along which the queue of 
vehicles extends in each i-th lane from the accident to the tunnel entrance. Estimation of the queue length is 
needed to evaluate the number of users potentially involved by the event and their egress routes. The queue 
model takes into account the traffic flow and compositions and the possible presence of devices able to close 
the tunnel and their activation times, as indicated in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4: Representation of partial tunnel filling in presence of effective measures for tunnel closing 
2.4 Development of accidental scenarios and users’ egress model 
After having estimated (thanks to the queue formation model) the number of users present in the tunnel and 
potentially exposed to the event, the egress of the users is evaluated using an uniform distribution for each i-th 
lane, as sketched in Figure 5. 
  
 
Figure 5: Identification of the cells through which the queue in each lane is discretized 
The uniform distribution allows lane discretization using cells. For each user, the escape route consists of the 
distance that he has to cover in order to move to a safe zone (shelter), reach the entrance/exit of the tunnel or 
use the available emergency exits and/or bypasses. However, the egress of the users is affected by the 
evolution of each accidental event. Of course, a recognition and pre-movement time, which includes the time 
to leave the vehicle, is considered for each user, which is a function of safety measures such as the presence 
of loudspeakers, variable message signs, etc. As an example, Figure 6 shows the development of a fire 
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scenario inside a ventilated tunnel using CFAST, a two-zone fire model able to calculate the evolving 
distribution of smoke, fire gases and temperature throughout the tunnel or a building during a fire (Tavelli et 
al., 2014). Each accidental scenario influences the egress of the users, because of a reduction of egress 
speed due to reduced visibility in presence of smoke and may cause deaths because of heat and smoke 
toxicity effects. This is evaluated dynamically for each user along his escape trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of fire consequences evolution inside a ventilated tunnel calculated with CFAST 
In general, the procedure for the evaluation of users’ tenability considers two steps: 
•  Verification of tenability of the users during pre-movement time; 
•  Verification during the egress process to the closest emergency exit. 
2.5 Calculation of the F-N curve and the expected damage value 
Using TRAM, it is possible to estimate the total number of fatalities (N) inside the tunnel for each s-th scenario, 
and each p-th position; the estimate considers the matrix of all the possible combinations with the system, 
infrastructure and management measures. A case study is used to present the F-N curve of a one-way tunnel.  
3. Case Study: F-N curve calculated by TRAM and comparison with QRAM software 
In order to further verify the model, the results were compared using QRAM software for several tunnels 
(ranging from 900 m to 4500 m) and possible accidental scenarios. It should be considered, however, that the 
selectable tunnel infrastructure measures, equipment and management procedures of the two models are not 
easy to compare.  
This comparison is believed to be useful for verifying qualitative trends and the position of the F-N curves.  
QRAM is a Quantitative Risk Assessment Model software developed jointly by PIARC (Permanent 
International Association of Road Congresses) and OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) for estimating the risk in tunnels and considers 13 accidental scenarios. 
Table 2: Main characteristics of Tunnel 1 
Parameter Value 
Length [m] 910 
Section [m2] 54 
Number of lanes 2 
Distance between the emergency exits [m] 500 
ADT [vehicles/day] 5623 
Peak time flow when the analysis was carried out [vehic/h] 562 (10 % ADT) 
Longitudinal slope [%] +3.4 
Average number of people in a light vehicle [n. people/vehicle] 2 
Average number of people in a heavy vehicle [n. people/vehicle] 1.1 
Average number of people in a bus [n. people/vehicle] 30 
Percentage of light vehicles [%] 85 
Percentage of heavy vehicles [%] 14 
Percentage of buses [%] 1 
Average speed of the light vehicles [km/h] 110 
Average speed of the heavy vehicles/buses [km/h] 70 
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One representative unidirectional tunnel is selected for comparison in this work. Table 2 presents the main 
characteristics of the tunnel and Figure 7 shows the comparison in terms of F-N curve between the proposed 
model (TRAM) and the QRAM software. Despite the difficulty due to the different approaches of the two 
models, the F-N curves are in reasonable agreement. The same result was observed for longer tunnels.  
 
 
Figure 7: F-N curves from present model, TRAM, and QRAM software for a tunnel with length 910 m and 
Average Daily Traffic (ADT) 5623 vehicles/day 
Conclusions 
This paper illustrates and describes the structure of a new quantitative model of risk analysis for road tunnels 
named TRAM. The model, in accordance with the legislation requirements, calculates the F-N curves of 
societal risk, by evaluating the frequency of occurrence of different accidental scenarios (F) and their expected 
consequences in terms of potential victims (N: number of fatalities). Starting from two initial events, a fire and 
a DG release, 18 accidental scenarios are evaluated. The frequencies of occurrence of each scenario 
analysed were obtained using the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) technique. The consequences are evaluated on 
the basis of a sub-model for the formation of a queue of vehicles in the tunnel and a sub-model for evacuation 
that evaluate users’ tenability during egress. For each of the 15 tunnel measures that can be selected by the 
analyst, the model can consider their reliability, hypothesizing that each selected measure could be, due to 
failure, eventually unavailable at the moment of need. A probabilistic parameter of reliability for each of the 
measure is defined to account for the failure possibility, thus generating a large number of combinations (215). 
Moreover, considering 18 accidental scenarios (9 fires and 9 DG releases) and a minimum of 6 possible 
positions along the tunnel, the model analyses up to 3 million total cases for a single tunnel. The calculation 
procedure has been automatized, in order to reduce execution time and the possibility of errors.  
Finally, to validate the model, comparisons were made with the QRAM software developed by PIARC for three 
representative tunnels. The comparison confirmed the validity and consistency of the proposed model. 
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